Editorial
In mid‑2025, Horn of Africa faces an unprecedented confluence of conflicts and political turmoil. A UN-backed analysis notes the reporting period “was marked by heightened political volatility” across IGAD states. In Sudan, renewed battles between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have surged beyond Khartoum into Darfur, Kordofan and the Blue Nile.
Civilians suffer the most: the fighting has driven mass displacement and a deepening humanitarian catastrophe. Meanwhile, South Sudan’s fragile peace process is unravelling amid leadership reshuffles and stalled agreements.
Somalia’s transition is also in crisis, as federal and regional elites clash over elections and power, even as al‑Shabaab strengthens its hold. These conflicts overlap with climate shocks and food shortages, compounding suffering for tens of millions. The impact strains regional diplomacy, threatening to splinter IGAD cohesion and demanding urgent attention from African leaders.
Sudan’s Unresolved War and Regional Spillovers
Sudan’s civil war has entered its third year with no let‑up. In April 2025 the two generals again rallied new recruits and supplies for a “swift military victory,” signaling further escalation.
A nominal peace roadmap was unveiled in February, but both SAF and RSF remain locked in combat, “focused on a military course of action”. International mediation has repeatedly stalled – a London conference in May 2025 failed to secure even a ceasefire.
Instead, in May Khartoum’s military council appointed a new Prime Minister (El-Tayeb Idris) to project normalcy and rejoin the African Union. Critics warn this move, amid continued fighting, will further erode trust and cement military power.
The toll is staggering. From 1 February to 23 May 2025, ACLED recorded 14,301 conflict fatalities in the Horn – a slight increase over previous quarters – with Sudan accounting for 7,059 of them. That is roughly half of all battle deaths in the region.
By comparison Somalia suffered 4,223 fatalities, Ethiopia 1,527 and South Sudan 1,268. The accompanying bar chart highlights Sudan’s dominant share of the carnage (see Figure 1).
These figures understate civilian trauma: in Darfur, RSF and allied fighters repeatedly struck IDP camps (such as Zamzam and Abu Shouk), causing waves of displacement and “widespread sexual violence against women and girls”. The RSF also used drones to bomb Port Sudan, briefly threatening oil exports.
The conflict is spilling over. Sudan’s twin wars with neighbors have intensified: clashes along the South Sudan and Chad borders threaten to draw in those capitals. Refugees and fighters are flowing outward. Uganda deployed troops to assist Juba against rebels, while Khartoum and Juba trade accusations. Even Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia are caught in proxy dynamics. As one analysis warns, the “absence of a broad-based and inclusive process” risks entrenching proxy battles across borders.
Ethiopia’s Fragility and Red Sea Ambitions
Ethiopia remains volatile at home. Government forces continue heavy operations against Fano militia in Amhara and armed groups in Oromia. In March 2025 Fano insurgents launched “Operation Unity,” intensifying coordinated attacks. By May four Fano brigades announced a unified command (the Amhara Fano National Force), raising fears of prolonged conflict in Ethiopia’s heartland.
Meanwhile, the Pretoria Agreement that ended the Tigray war is under strain: the National Elections Board deregistered the TPLF party in May, prompting Tigrayan leaders to call for AU intervention. National dialogue talks have resumed at the federal level, but key regions remain outside the process – notably Tigray – keeping the political situation “fragile”. Civil society and analysts warn that without genuine inclusion, Ethiopia’s conflicts could become deeply entrenched and spread to new areas.
At the same time, Addis Ababa has grown more assertive over access to the Red Sea. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed emphasizes Ethiopian “existential” interests in ports and shipping routes.
This posture alarmed neighboring littoral states. In March Djibouti and Egypt issued a joint statement insisting that Red Sea security is “a sovereign prerogative of the littoral states” and calling for revival of the Council of Arab and African Littoral States to coordinate security.
Eritrea has quietly strengthened ties with Egypt and Sudan in response. Ethiopia perceives these moves – including Eritrea’s involvement – as an attempt to “encircle” it, potentially heightening regional polarisation. In short, Ethiopia’s foreign ambitions overlap with its domestic fragility, risking new disputes.
South Sudan’s Political Turmoil
South Sudan’s unity government is unravelling. The Revitalized Peace Agreement (R-ARCSS) implementation has stalled amid unilateral power plays by President Salva Kiir. In February Kiir reshuffled his cabinet and parties: he sidelined Vice President James Wani Igga and SPLM figures, appointing longtime ally Benjamin Bol Mel to key posts.
Later in May, multiple SPLM-IO leaders (including Riek Machar’s deputies) were also removed or detained. These moves “triggered localized violence and deepened political fragmentation,” according to UN reports. The National Security Service arrested senior SPLM-IO officials, and clashes erupted between government forces and Machar-loyal militias.
Observers warn the pattern undermines the unity government. IGAD’s Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission has noted repeated violations of the peace deal and fallen silent amid SPLM factionalism. Without a halt to these maneuvers, the window for reform appears to be closing. South Sudan’s rule of law is threatened too: reports emerged of army checkpoints abusing civilians and even air strikes on civilian areas, signaling grave human rights violations.
Insecurity has even flared in more peaceful regions (e.g. Equatoria) over banditry and armed-group infighting. If left unchecked, South Sudan risks sliding back into wider war, a warning of how fragile its hard-won peace really is.
Somalia’s Political and Security Challenges
Somalia’s transition is equally precarious. Deep mistrust has paralysed federal–state relations. In early May a national Consultative Council meant to bridge Mogadishu and regional governments was boycotted by Puntland and Jubaland leaders.
Those states accuse the federal government of sidelining them on elections, security and power-sharing. President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s recent creation of a new party (with himself as chair) is viewed by critics as an attempt to consolidate authority.
In response, an opposition bloc – the “Somali Salvation Forum” – formed in May to unify resistance to what they call the President’s unilateral approach.
Election preparations have become a flashpoint. In April Somalia’s electoral commission launched voter registration for one-person-one-vote polls (2025–26), long delayed since 2016. But Puntland and Jubaland have boycotted the process, and significant funding shortfalls have emerged.
Without consensus, experts fear the political rift will widen. Meanwhile, al-Shabaab remains active: insurgents recently advanced in southern regions, and attacks have restricted humanitarian access in central Somalia.
An under-resourced African Union force (ATMIS/AUSSOM) struggles to contain them, raising the specter that security will deteriorate further. The combined effect of elite infighting and Islamist violence deepens Somalia’s insecurity.
Humanitarian Toll: Hunger, Displacement, Access
The human cost of these conflicts is enormous. The IGAD region hosts an estimated 24.4 million people who are refugees, internally displaced or returnees. Over half of them (about 11.3 million) are displaced within Sudan alone. Somalia and Ethiopia host roughly 3.9 and 1.9 million IDPs respectively.
In addition, the region’s food crisis is acute. By June 2025 some 56.7 million people across the Horn were classified as acutely food insecure – up from 54.2m at the start of the year.
The burden falls heavily on conflict-affected states. Sudan tops the list with 24.6 million food-insecure people, followed by South Sudan (7.7m), Somalia (4.6m) and Kenya (2.8m). Acute hunger in Darfur has even reached famine levels in some areas. These numbers capture a grim reality: violence and displacement are fueling hunger across the region.
Humanitarian access is worsening. Aid workers face increasing danger from the fighting in Sudan and Somalia. In Sudan the combined SAF–RSF air campaigns and drone threats have created “complex and high-risk” environments for relief operations. Human-rights abuses – from mass kidnappings by militias to reports of ethnic killings – are mounting.
Women and children bear the brunt: conflict-related sexual violence has surged in Darfur and elsewhere. In Somalia, insecurity in central and southern regions has blocked major roads, complicating relief delivery to drought-affected communities. These challenges, superimposed on inflation and flooding, mean acute needs will only grow.
Regional Diplomacy Strained
The turmoil has put regional institutions under strain. IGAD member states are increasingly divided on how to respond. For example, the Djibouti–Egypt initiative to activate a Council of Red Sea littoral states was a pointed signal that the Horn’s coastal nations may prefer ad hoc coalitions over IGAD’s framework. Similarly, IGAD’s attempts to mediate in Juba and Khartoum have met with limited success. South Sudan’s progress talks have stalled despite IGAD and AU involvement, and Sudan’s peace negotiations remain deadlocked.
Neighbors not party to IGAD, like Libya and Eritrea, are now major players in Sudan’s conflict. In short, the traditional hubs of East African diplomacy are losing coherence just as the crises intensify.
This fragmentation is worrisome. When regional coordination falters, conflicts spill further. Already we see Ethiopia bristling at perceived encirclement, and Ugandan–Kenyan relations have been rocky over rebel spillover and political disputes. Within IGAD, trust is thin: agreements (on Abyei, for example) have been derailed by the wider wars.
African leaders and IGAD policymakers cannot afford to wait. The Horn’s crises are interlinked: instability in one country exacerbates challenges in its neighbors. The data tell a clear story: multi‑dimensional emergencies of conflict, drought and malnutrition threaten to spiral further without intervention.
A neutral, region‑grounded approach is needed. This means bolstering inclusive political dialogues in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia; protecting fragile peace in South Sudan; and ensuring unimpeded humanitarian relief.
It means keeping lines open in IGAD and the African Union, even if progress is slow, and resisting external pressures that split the region into rival camps.
Ultimately, the Horn’s fate affects all of Africa. South African, East African and SADC forums should weigh in alongside IGAD to coordinate peace efforts and aid flows. The plight of millions of displaced and hungry demands action now.
As one IGAD report warned, the conflicts are creating “a vicious cycle” of food insecurity and displacement. The choice before African policymakers is clear: either shore up regional solidarity and address root grievances, or risk watching the Horn’s turmoil spread even wider.
